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ABSTRACT 
 
JEREMY POWELL: Bersani avec Kubrick 
(Under the direction of Richard C. Cante) 
 
 
 In this paper, Leo Bersani’s critical writings are brought to bear on Stanley 
Kubrick’s The Shining (1980). Exploring ideas about coupling, relationality, subjectivity 
and cinema, in this paper Bersani’s account of aesthetic engagement is both affirmed and 
reinflected. 
Ingmar Bergman’s Scenes from a Marriage (1973), The Shining, and an online 
parody trailer called “Shining” are examined. These films reveal narrative cinema’s 
difficulties in mounting a potent critique of coupling. Bersani’s writings propose that 
cinema best offers not a critique of coupling, but a relational model for a mode of being 
in the world. This mode of being, enabled by “the communication of forms,” is an 
alternative to our usual mode, governed by “the enigmatic signifier.” However, we can 
survive in either of these modes only through an oscillation between the two. 
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CHAPTER 1 
DISSOLVING SCREEN COUPLES? 
 
The first episode of Ingmar Bergman’s 1973 television miniseries Scenes from a 
Marriage offers many hints of marital turmoil to come, as Johan and Marianne are 
interviewed for a puff piece by a TV journalist keen to present them as an ideal couple 
with “a perfect life.”1 After corroborating Johan’s upbeat account of their ostensibly 
problem-free relationship, Marianne reveals a certain anxiety about their future, noting 
that “the very lack of problems could cause strife.” Then, when her husband has stepped 
away to take a phone call, Marianne is pressed by her interlocutor on the topic of love. 
She responds, “If [the apostle] Paul is right about love, it’s so rare that hardly anyone 
ever experiences it . . . Personally, I find it’s enough to be kind to the person you live 
with. Affection is also good. Humor, friendship, tolerance. Having reasonable 
expectations. If you have all that, then love isn’t necessary.” Marianne laments that 
people are “forced to play all these roles” that put “unrealistic emotional demands” on us, 
and she wishes that “we could be kinder to each other.” The interviewer misinterprets 
these remarks as signs of a yearning for a more romantic life. 
The couple separates approximately halfway through the miniseries’ five-hour 
running time, when Johan sits his wife down and proclaims that he is leaving her for a 
younger woman. We the viewers have had little forewarning of this development, and we 
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and Marianne learn of his infidelity at the same time. Her devastated pleas for Johan to 
stay manage to provoke his rage but do not succeed in forestalling a separation. The two 
characters then embark upon the oscillation between extremes of bitterness and 
bittersweetness that will occupy Scenes’ three remaining episodes. We witness these two 
characters discovering that the dissolution of their couple was not so clean a break as they 
had thought. They end the film snuggling together in bed, proclaiming their still-present 
love for each other—but with no apparent intention to remarry.2 
With unrestrained dialogue, emotionally raw acting, and intimate mise-en-scène, 
Bergman’s film is ferociously critical. But critical of what, precisely? The very title 
Scenes from a Marriage proclaims the limit of its critique: in attacking the institution of 
bourgeois marriage, Scenes stops short of critiquing coupling. Marriage is vivisected 
(without anesthetic!) and left, as it were, to expire on the table. But the couple, the dyad, 
is left alive. That is to say, Bergman advances a strong position against marriage, but 
leaves intact the hegemony of coupling. By never suggesting any viable alternative to the 
dyad, and by focusing his critique on the institution of marriage, Bergman winds up 
reinforcing the seeming inevitability of coupling as the dominant mode of living. 
Generically Scenes from a Marriage is an art film. It’s also an “Art Film,” created 
by arguably the premier auteur of that moment in film history. 3 By contrast, in the 
various genres that comprise popular Hollywood cinema, the expectation of the formation 
of a couple in light/happy entertainment (or of the dissolution of a couple in heavy/sad 
entertainment) tends to be so strong that we viewers often adopt a sort of paranoid 
position toward the various potentials for coupling among a given film’s characters. From 
this position, we continually scan the film for diegetic and nondiegetic cues that might 
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hint at particular couplings (or de-couplings) to come. We thus hope to anticipate, and 
therefore not to be taken aback by, the vicissitudes of the narrative’s moves toward and 
away from couplings. Many of us have marked, generally inconsistent, idiosyncratic 
preferences for (or against) certain kinds of resolutions to certain kinds of coupling-
potentials among certain kinds of interpersonal configurations between certain kinds of 
characters. Such preferences permit each of us to feel as though his or her own take on 
coupling is distinctive. But their very multiplicity may also reinforce our understanding 
of coupling as the natural and inevitable way of relating to each other, and perhaps even 
to the world. 
Compared with Scenes from a Marriage, which announces itself as an almost 
prototypical deployment of the dissolution-of-the-couple trope, my second example may 
at first seem an odder choice. The Shining (1980) occupies a generic position mid-way 
between the art film and the horror film. Stanley Kubrick’s post-Dr. Strangelove forays 
into various popular genres are closer in spirit to the “art film” than to whichever other 
genres are also being employed: “hard” science fiction in 2001: A Space Odyssey; 
dystopian science fiction in A Clockwork Orange; historical costume drama in Barry 
Lyndon; the war film in Full Metal Jacket; and the erotic thriller in Eyes Wide Shut. The 
progression of the dissolution of The Shining’s couple is implied via classic art film 
techniques of composition and rhythm as well as sometimes obscure symbolism. The 
Overlook Hotel inhabits its characters as perhaps no cinematic milieu ever had, at least 
outside of the work of Michelangelo Antonioni. What there is to understand about this 
couple is conveyed in large part through the way the oppressive setting is oppressively 
filmed by Kubrick’s camera. 
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Nonetheless, the particular elements of The Shining that I want to discuss also 
have much to do with its aspects as a horror film. Jack Torrance (Jack Nicholson) doesn’t 
merely reject or abandon his wife and son. He tries to murder them. Early commentators, 
including Stephen King—the author of the novel from which the film was adapted—
complained that Nicholson’s Jack is too disturbed from the beginning, and then goes 
totally bonkers too unsubtly and too quickly.4 Such opinions express a desire to witness a 
more protracted descent into a more realistic madness, starting from an initial state of 
normality. Such a change would also have the effect of prolonging the segment of the 
narrative during which the inevitability of the couple’s ultimate dissolution is not yet 
definite. 
In the film as it is (rather than as these reviewers seem to think they might prefer 
it), we are never permitted—not even in its earliest moments—to see the contemporary 
couple constituted by Jack and his wife Wendy (Shelley Duvall) as an even outwardly 
“happy” one. Wendy displays too much nervous anxiety, which is too obviously directed 
at the ever-present possibility of Jack’s eruption into rage. Jack, for his part, behaves 
alternately distractedly, contemptuously, and angrily toward his wife. At one point he 
refers to her as “the old sperm bank.” Despite using this degrading epithet, and despite 
looking lustfully at other women (natural women as well as a supernatural/hallucinated 
one), he never once displays any sexual interest in Wendy. Nor does she display any in 
him. 
All of this notwithstanding—or perhaps because of all of this—the couple of The 
Shining, as a couple, could hardly be described as “unstable.” Indeed, an ill-advised 
dedication to stability might be viewed as this couple’s main problem. At least one of the 
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individuals (Jack) seems to have “wanted out” since long before the beginning of the 
film’s plot. Yet, in the early scenes, he is unable even to make any initial move toward 
the couple’s dissolution. Instead, he remains trapped in a state of stalled movement of 
which his writer’s block is only the most obvious symptom. Whether typing, aimlessly 
bouncing a ball, or running his hand along the long walls of the halls of the hotel, Jack is 
stuck in a series of cycles of aimless physical repetitions that never really accomplish any 
significant motion. Finally, his violent psychosis emerges to force a change. 
There’s another reason why The Shining might seem to be an unusual choice to 
exemplify the dissolution-of-the-couple’s functions in filmic narrativity. It’s common to 
discuss The Shining not as the story of the dissolution of a couple, but rather as the story 
of the dissolution of a family. Jack’s psychosis seems to be the product of a reaction 
against his duties as a father more than a reaction against his duties as a husband. Michel 
Ciment, for instance, reads the film as “the definitive victory of the son over the father.” 
Ciment notes that the “relationships within the Torrance family illustrate the classic 
development of the Oedipal triangle.”5 But the triangulation inherent in the Oedipal 
family could not, of course, come to be without having been preceded by the strong 
libidinal dyad of the mother and father. That is to say, the Oedipal family is predicated 
upon the couple, even though not all couples necessarily become (Oedipal) families. 
It is here that The Shining reaches the limit of its critique. Kubrick’s film narrates 
the dissolution of an overly stable couple, a dissolution that requires each of the couple’s 
members to become monstrous in their own ways. Jack becomes a raving, bestial maniac.  
Wendy becomes perhaps the most unappealing “scream queen” ever to star in the horror 
genre. So far, so good.  
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But Kubrick, like Bergman, stops short of challenging the dyad. In fact, he stops 
even shorter. Whereas Bergman did at least powerfully attack marriage, Kubrick 
positively affirms the stable Oedipal family. Jack long ago abdicated his responsibilities 
as “caretaker” of his son and wife. In one highly available interpretation of the film’s 
narrative, then, it is his personal, moral failure to fulfill these responsibilities that corrupts 
the stability of this couple into an imprisoning force from the get-go. 
My interest in this paper is in the possibility of cinematic and theoretical critiques 
of coupling. Given that, it is not at all clear to me that there is anything much to be gained 
(here) from a detailed description of cinematic narratives that employ the obverse of what 
I have been discussing:  the formation-of-the-couple. Of course, I don’t wish to claim that 
all such cinematic narratives are “created equal.” Certainly, a wide range of disparate 
ethical and aesthetic projects may be mounted within films that narratologically move 
toward the formation of a couple. Yet it is difficult to imagine that any potent critique of 
coupling could be developed within such a film. This is perhaps because the motivation 
toward coupling is so dominant within our culture that the pleasure provided by the 
formation of the couple at the conclusion of a cinematic narrative tends to overwhelm and 
negate any critical observations that might have been managed. Perhaps such a critique 
could be accomplished only by the formation of a couple that, at least as a couple, is in 
some way truly monstrous. Even in that case, though, any such critique seems likely to 
reach its limit once it inevitably brushes against the aforementioned difficulty of 
imagining and presenting viable alternatives to coupling. (“Stay single”?) 
 Here “Shining,” a re-cut trailer virally distributed online, appears as an 
interesting cultural artifact. This piece subverts the dissolution-of-the-couple in Kubrick’s 
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film by distorting it precisely into its opposite: a formation-of-the-couple narrative.6 
“Shining” manipulates images and dialogue from The Shining to make the feature film 
appear to be a romantic comedy about a boy (Danny) in search of a father figure. In the 
narrative of “Shining,” Jack is a frustrated writer who is rescued from his creative block 
by coupling with Wendy and adopting Danny. (If I read the trailer’s cues correctly, 
Danny, though in Wendy’s charge, is not her son.) According to The New York Times, 
this re-cut trailer was designed for a contest sponsored by the New York chapter of the 
Association of Independent Creative Editors. Participants were challenged to create a 
trailer for any existing movie that made that movie appear to belong to a different genre. 
What I find interesting here is not the ripeness of a horror film to be recast as a 
romantic comedy, but that of a couple-dissolution plot to be transformed into a couple-
formation plot. Furthermore, while “Shining” does include a schmaltzy voice-over, a few 
sound effects and an upbeat excerpt from Peter Gabriel’s song “Solsbury Hill,” one if its 
added elements sticks out much more ostentatiously. This is a line of dialogue, “I’m your 
new foster father,” extracted from Nicholson’s performance in a different film, About 
Schmidt (2002). Recognizing that this line derives from a film other than The Shining is 
quite dissatisfying, since it seems to violate the purity of the exercise. This violation 
might also seem to weaken the short film’s perfection as a demonstration of couple-
formation’s immanent relation to couple-dissolution. On the contrary, precisely because 
the added line is so glaringly unnecessary to fully understanding the trailer’s narrative, 
dissatisfaction at noticing this “impurity” may be read as more evidence of the notion that 
each trope may, in fact, be perfectly immanent within the other. 
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All three of these texts demonstrate that any incipient critique of coupling within 
a cinematic narrative employing the dissolution-of-the-couple trope tends to be quite 
recuperable by the hegemony of coupling. Scenes from a Marriage ultimately proclaims 
the resilience of the couple as a libidinal dyad, even after the onscreen couple’s 
emotionally vicious dissolution as a pair of persons sharing their everyday lives. We can 
see this also in the example of The Shining, which might conceivably be read as a 
terrifying cautionary tale against allowing one’s own couplings to become so stable that 
one cannot readily withdraw from them—but which finally seems to convey, much more 
compellingly, a message about the paramount importance of embracing one’s obligations 
to the structure of the Oedipal family (and to the “overarching” dyad installed within it). 
The alternative proposed by The Shining to the “all work” of couple-based 
responsibilities is not unlimited “play.” Instead, it is indiscriminately destructive 
repetition and madness, followed by the permanent stasis of frozen death. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
THE BIG UNCOUPLING 
 
 Leo Bersani, who has approached many of the issues that these films put on the 
table, is an interesting, somewhat controversial figure on the contemporary critical scene. 
His work is open to attack from many quarters. He could easily be pigeonholed as a 
protomystical thinker of limited range, as being of interest primarily those engaged with a 
few particular subcultures: especially francophiles and urban(e) queers, and maybe even 
just white, bourgeois gay males. He writes almost exclusively about high modernism in 
literature, painting and film. His work often flies beneath the radars both of popularists 
and of those for whom the close reading of works of art without much reference to those 
works’ sociohistorical contexts is not a sufficient and/or valid methodology. Worst of all, 
his work has been very pointedly criticized as an attempt to justify and maintain his own 
class, race, and gender privilege.7 
In the opposite corner of the ring, some scholars have high praise for Bersani. 
Interestingly, though, such praise often seems to take the form of brief citation. Adam 
Phillips, for instance, has written that although “most of the best popular psychoanalytic 
theory takes relationship for granted,” in his opinion “much of the most interesting 
psychoanalytic theory today is skeptical of the whole notion of relationship (Freud, 
Lacan, Laplanche, Bersani).”8 Although Phillips’ article goes on to discuss the work of 
the first three writers in his parenthetical citation, Bersani is not mentioned again. This 
  10 
seems to me somewhat typical of the way that many writers choose to acknowledge an 
affinity with Bersani’s thought. The tendency may have developed as a reaction to the 
difficulty of describing Bersani’s work without discussing it at length. Perhaps it’s also a 
reaction to the difficulty of discussing Bersani’s work at all without making it sound 
deliberately obscurantist. And his intimate association with queer culture probably 
discourages engagement from “straight” scholars, either for the more obviously 
lamentable reasons or because such scholars fear being left open to contradictory charges 
of recuperative appropriation or of “de-queering” the politics of Bersani’s work. Putting 
such speculations aside, I will attempt to do justice to the development of some of 
Bersani’s complex, heterodox, and highly dynamic intellectual project. It is first and 
foremost—I will argue—a project against the couple. 
 For Bersani, the critique of coupling must not remain at the level of interpersonal 
relations. His thought has been progressively re-located from the register of the couple, to 
the register of the dyad (as a copulative mode of relation between a subject and an 
object), to the register of relationality more broadly conceived (attempting to think 
alternatives to the subject-object mode of relating). Tracing these moves will require 
some time and effort, so, before we begin, let me explain why I agree with Bersani that 
such a re-location is necessary in the first place. 
Bersani’s critique—and any other possible critique of coupling—should be 
conceived as distinct from the somewhat more familiar critiques of patriarchy, marriage, 
heteronormativity, and compulsory reproductivity. The first of these usually focuses on 
socially constructed disparities between a dominant male group and a subordinated 
female group. The second focuses on a specific institutional practice, and has historically 
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devoted much of its attention to juridical supports for oppressive social formations (such 
as divorce laws). This concern with changing laws and regulations has of course become 
a crucial aspect of many (though not all) critiques of heteronormativity, too. And the 
critique of compulsory reproductivity often aims at improving reproductive rights. But in 
its most intellectually suggestive form, this last critique aims to re-place the leverage 
point of ethical, aesthetic and political calculations toward the pleasures of “the present,” 
as well as toward more risky attitudes about possible “futures.”9  
The critique of coupling, however, must remain conceptually distinct from each 
of these other critiques. One could, with varying degrees of difficulty and plausibility, 
construct arguments attacking any one or more of these constructions while leaving the 
others more or less intact. Although it is true that much of the most interesting theoretical 
writing addressing any of these individual concerns seems to address all of them 
(including the critique of coupling), I contend that such critiques of coupling finally don’t 
get far enough away from it. 
For example, Lee Edelman’s recently influential book No Future: Queer Theory 
and the Death Drive is yet another ferocious critique. It has been influential partly thanks 
to what seems to be its relatively broad relevance to any political project for radically 
rethinking futurity. Edelman savages the ideology of “reproductive futurism,” thereby 
performing explicit critiques of compulsory reproductivity and heteronormativity along 
with implicit critiques of patriarchy and, perhaps, marriage too. But he seems to leave 
coupling well enough alone. 
This may be an oversimplification. But it is not, I think, a misrepresentation of the 
book’s argument, a summary of which might proceed like this: according to Edelman, the 
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dominant ideology in our culture is that of reproductive futurism, whereby social value is 
invested in a certain futurity—specifically, in the world as it will be in the future for the 
children of the present. Under such a regime, politics necessarily will always remain 
“conservative” in the sense that it “works to affirm a structure, to authenticate social 
order, which it then intends to transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child.”10 Due 
in part to the fact that homosexual sex never results in procreation, the antithesis of 
Childhood becomes Queerness. The figure of the queer thus carries both the burden and 
the privilege of figuring jouissance, “a movement beyond the pleasure principle, beyond 
the distinction of pleasure and pain, a violent passage beyond the bounds of identity, 
meaning, and law” (25). 
For Edelman here, it doesn’t seem to matter much that many homosexuals adopt 
children or even have children of their own. What matters more is that the sex act 
between people of the same sex is entirely disarticulated from any possibility that this act 
might result in the production of a child, and is thus also disarticulated from the ideology 
of reproductive futurism. Edelman presents the (male) homosexual as a solitary, driven 
One who is also—fantasmatically, for reproductive futurists—a Zero. But he is never 
once, in the body Edelman’s text, described as part of a Two.11 In this way, largely by 
implication, No Future mildly critiques coupling as a side effect of its argumentative 
main line. But, for reasons that will soon become clear, Edelman’s figurations of solitary, 
menacing, absolutely negative gay men—what he calls sinthomosexuals—seem to me not 
to be of much help in conceptualizing a non-copulative mode of relationality.   
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Leo Bersani is briefly cited twice in the pages of No Future. Bersani also 
provided a promotional blurb for the back cover of the paperback version. That blurb is 
worth reproducing here in full: 
 
In consistently brilliant theoretical discussions (for the most part, 
psychoanalytically inspired), as well as in strikingly original readings of 
Dickens, George Eliot, and Hitchcock, Lee Edelman argues that in a 
political culture dominated by the sentimental illusions and frequently 
murderous moral imperatives of “reproductive futurism,” homosexuality 
has been assigned—and should deliberately and defiantly take on—the 
burden of a negativity at once embedded within and violently disavowed 
by that culture. The paradoxical dignity of queerness would be its refusal 
to believe in a redemptive future, its embrace of the unintelligibility, even 
the inhumanity inherent in sexuality. Edelman’s extraordinary text is so 
powerful that we could perhaps reproach him only for not spelling out the 
mode in which we might survive our necessary assent to his argument. 
- Leo Bersani12 
 
 
But, in his own work, Bersani has upped the ante on Edelman. Or, rather, he 
already had at the time he penned the above text. 
In the 1980s, Bersani’s work took as one of its organizing principles the 
theorization and celebration of a relinquishment of identitarian organizational structures. 
Bersani proposed the cultivation of a movement toward the elimination not of the 
psychological subject per se, but of the individual. This could occur, he argued, through 
processes and, sometimes, “events” of self-defeat. These amount to failures of the stable 
ego-structures of psychologically individuated persons, or their “dis-organization.” Such 
failures happen in the form of the ego’s temporary transgression of its own boundaries, 
spilling out (so to speak) so that the subject momentarily no longer distinguishes between 
self and other. 
  14 
This transgression is called self-shattering or ébranlement, a term Bersani adapted 
from the work of Jean Laplanche. It is defined as “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension 
of sexual excitement [that] occurs when the body’s ‘normal’ range of sensation is 
exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed by sensations or 
affective processes somehow ‘beyond’ those compatible with psychic organization.”13 
For Bersani, “[s]exuality is perhaps as close as we come (short of death) to the beneficent 
destruction of the empirical individual, a destruction that is identical to the body’s most 
intense concentrations on its own capacity for sensations.”14 
By way of analogy to Freud’s distinction between primary narcissism and 
secondary narcissism, Bersani designated the masochism found in adult sadomasochistic 
sexual practices as secondary masochism, in order to distinguish it from primary 
masochism. “Wholly devoid [. . .] of such moral components as the guilt with which a 
later, secondary masochism will be burdened (and corrupted), the primary masochistic 
desire would seek merely to repeat the ecstatic suffering of a pure ébranlement.”15 
In The Freudian Body, The Culture of Redemption and Homos, Bersani posited 
ébranlement as immanent to all modes of sexuality, but as more readily accessible 
through particular sexual practices:  rimming (for the “active” partner only); cruising; and 
homosexual activity in general.16 Bersani’s enthusiastic willingness (during this period of 
his work) to implicitly hierarchize—I see no way around calling it hierarchization—
human sexual practices according to their capacity for providing instances of ébranlement 
often seemed to be at odds, at least in spirit, with his delightful attacks on “puritanical 
feminism” and on various thinkers’ projects for a “redemptive reinvention of sex.”17 
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In 1997, Bersani was interviewed by Tim Dean, Hal Foster, and Kaja Silverman. 
The interview, published in the journal October, is a particularly useful piece for two 
reasons. First, the dialogic nature of the interview situation maneuvers Bersani into 
addressing directly some previously ambiguous elements of his writing.18 Second, this 
interview finds Bersani on the cusp of a major shift of focus:  
 
Bersani: [Ébranlement is not necessarily] a characteristic of our sexual 
lives; it means that a masochistic self-shattering was constitutive of 
our identity as sexual beings, that it is present, always, not 
primarily in our orgasms but rather in the terrifying but also 
exhilarating instability of human subjectivity. [The] originary 
experience of masochism [. . .] cannot be forgotten or done away 
with; we always revert to it in some way; there is always a memory 
of self-constitution that includes this masochistic coming-into-
being of the sexual.19 
 
 
This statement marks a significant, if subtle, shift in Bersani’s thinking. 
Ébranlement is still considered to be always already accessible precisely through our 
orgasms, and more readily accessible through particular ways of achieving those 
orgasms. But Bersani is now also focusing on ébranlement as the gateway to an 
alternative mode of subjectivity—or, more accurately, to an alternative way of being. 
Ébranlement’s radical potentialities lie in the possibility of divesting the psychological 
subject of its subjectivity, i.e., of its capacity for identifying itself as a subject in relation 
to a field of objects. This subject divested of subjectivity is one not delimited by any 
stable boundaries between self and not-self, or self and world.20 
Given how frightening, perhaps also how dubious this probably sounds, one must 
ask: why has this potential by this point become so appealing to Bersani? The answer lies 
in coupling. 
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In “Forming Couples (Contempt),” the first chapter of Leo Bersani and Ulysse 
Dutoit’s book Forms of Being: Cinema, Aesthetics, Subjectivity, the authors closely read 
the film Le Mépris (Godard, 1963) as a cinematic critique of coupling. From the first 
lines of the chapter, the authors lay down the stakes of their argument. But they do this 
without fully informing us, up-front, of the nature of those stakes. 
 “Contempt cements the couple,” they write in the chapter’s first line. Having 
written this, they acknowledge this sentiment’s opposition to conventional wisdom: “An 
arguably more plausible view would be that contempt drives the couple apart, a view 
supported—or so it has been maintained—by Jean-Luc Godard’s 1963 film Contempt, in 
which a wife’s sudden contempt for her husband deals the death-blow to an idyllic 
intimacy.”21 Bersani and Dutoit proceed to argue that, in both Godard’s film and 
everyday relationality, “the looks that express contempt as well as those that react to it, 
far from signifying the dissolution of the couple, reduce the entire relational field to the 
structure of the intimately conjoined couple” (19-21; emphasis mine). The writers oppose 
this category of the “intimately conjoined couple” to a second mode of interacting with 
“the relational field”; they call this other mode non-copulative pairing. 
The intimately conjoined couple is, for Bersani and Dutoit, “immobili[z]ed by 
seduction, fascination and paranoia” as a result of the way each person in the couple has 
been constituted as an individuated subject. This constitution has occurred for each 
through his or her encounter with what Bersani, again following Laplanche, calls the 
enigmatic signifier. This “message by which the child is seduced, but which he or she 
cannot read” is the form in which the child receives unconscious and sexual significations 
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of the psychologically motivated world of adults, installed unintentionally but inevitably 
by the caregiver (37). 
For Bersani, this installation constitutes an “original seduction” with lamentable 
consequences. In “Sociality and Sexuality,” he writes that “we are originally seduced into 
a relation by messages we can’t read, enigmatic messages that are perhaps inevitably 
interpreted as secrets. The result of this original seduction would be a tendency to 
structure all relations on the basis of an eroticizing mystification.”22 After this original 
seduction, “[t]he enigmatic signifier becomes a knowledge [that all others] are at once 
willfully withholding from me and using in order to invade my being.” As a result, we 
routinely “confront others with paranoid mistrust” (646). Because each sexuated human 
subject is constituted through the installation of the enigmatic signifier, it’s 
extraordinarily difficult for any of us to escape the mode of relating to the world that is 
thus initiated: 
 
The inability to decipher the enigmatic signifier constitutes us as sexual 
beings—that is, beings in whom desire or lack is central. Desire as lack is 
born [. . .] as the exciting pain of a certain ignorance: the failure to 
penetrate the sense of the other’s soliciting—through touch, voice, gesture, 
or look—of our body. The enigmatic signifier narrows and centers our 
look; it is the originating model of a relationality in which subject and 
object are separated by the distance of an imaginary secret or a special 
authority, a distance that only ‘knowledge’ might cross or eliminate.23  
 
 
Imagining the possibility of possessing such knowledge leads to (among other things) a 
constant, paranoid scanning of both the other and the world for clues to the nature and 
location of that knowledge. 
In this model of subjectivity and of subjectivity’s limits, then, every human 
subject is constitutively paranoid as well as constitutively appropriative. He or she is 
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protectively and proactively invasive of a world that constantly appears to want to invade 
the subject.  Bersani and Dutoit put it this way in their book on Derek Jarman: “Desire 
imprisoned in lack avenges itself by a furious incorporation of objects, an attempt 
literally to stuff the hole of desiring being.”24 Here they also make crystal clear just 
what’s at stake, for them, in escaping the appropriative relationality governed by the 
enigmatic signifier: “Nothing less than psychic survival may depend on imagining [non-
appropriative] relational lines” (71). 
For Bersani, such lines may be imagined only after recognizing what he has in 
different phases of his work called homo-ness and the extensibility of sameness. This 
“sameness” is not necessarily extended as “humanness.” In Forms of Being, Bersani and 
Dutoit write: “Immanent in every subject is its similitudes with other subjects (and other 
objects)—similitudes that are illuminated, that ‘shine’ into visibility when those others 
intersect with the subject’s spatial or temporal trajectories.”25 For a subject, this means 
recognizing that “in approaching otherness, he is also moving toward himself. A non-
antagonistic relation to difference depends on this inaccurate replication of the self in 
difference, on our recognizing that we are already out there.” After this recognition, 
“[d]ifference can then be loved as a non-threatening supplement to sameness,” rather than 
hated as a necessarily invasive threat.26 
Yes, loved. In other words, Bersani thinks that “the only way we can love the 
other or the external world is to find ourselves somehow in it. Only then can there be a 
nonviolent relation to the external world that doesn’t seek to eliminate difference.”27 And, 
fortunately, we are always already able to find ourselves replicated outside ourselves. 
These replications are only “inaccurate,” never perfect; to find one of them is to form a 
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non-copulative pairing between the subject and a part of the world. “We love [only] 
inaccurate replications of ourselves [because] we relate to difference by recognizing and 
longing for sameness. All love is, in a sense, homoerotic.”28  
To sum up in a single phrase, then: the relational regime of the enigmatic signifier 
is to the intimately conjoined couple as the relational regime of homo-ness (or the 
extensibility of sameness) is to non-copulative pairings. 
When he was working with the earlier model of self-defeat through ébranlement, 
Bersani’s project amounted to the development, primarily through close readings of 
exemplary literary texts, of what he called an “ethical erotics.” “[I]f a community were 
ever to exist in which it would no longer seem natural to define all relations as property 
relations (not only my money or my land, but also my country, my wife, my lover), we 
would first have to imagine a new erotics. Without that, all revolutionary activity will 
return, as we have seen it return over and over again, to relations of ownership and 
dominance.”29 In such passages as this one from Homos, we see that Bersani’s radicalism 
is in some ways not too far removed from a good old-fashioned post-1968 utopianist 
critique of the interconnections between economic conditions and culturally constructed 
consciousness. “The notion of property contaminates all relationality,” he writes.30 It 
doesn’t get much more succinct than that. However, I think “property” here refers not 
merely to owned material objects but, much more broadly, to subject-object relations in 
general. For, with the theory of non-copulative pairings, Bersani wants to describe a 
relational regime in which only very weak distinctions can possibly pertain between the 
subject, other subjects, and objects. In this regime, sameness is all. 
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Bersani’s most recent work, including Forms of Being, is characterized by an 
interest in formulating the non-psychological “subject” of/in a world of such non-
copulative pairings. This “subject” still experiences desire. But this kind of “desire” has 
nothing whatsoever to do with lack. Bersani’s project, as a whole, now appears to have 
been to theorize “a re-circuiting away from the psychological subject to modes of 
singularity (rather than varieties of personality) defined by networks of similitudes [. . .] 
not only among human subjects, but also between the human and the non-human.”31 
What he here calls “networks of similitudes” are often referred to in his recent work as 
the correspondence of forms, or the communication of forms. It is within this register of 
formal correspondences/communications that the subject of non-copulative pairings 
glimmers into being. Coupling—one psychological subject becoming attached to a 
second psychological subject in a strong libidinal dyad—is antithetical to this 
reformulation of the subject’s relations with its world. To put it in only slightly reductive 
terms, then, in his later work Bersani seems to discover that, throughout his critical 
project, coupling has been the symptom rather than the disease. 
Speaking with Kaja Silverman in 1997, Bersani had defended the centrality of 
primary masochism (the desire to repeat ébranlement) to his explication of his own 
project: 
 
Bersani: I am now interested in masochism not as pleasure in pain so 
much as the pleasure of at once losing the self and discovering it 
elsewhere, inaccurately replicated. 
Silverman: Why is it still masochistic? 
Bersani: Because it still means a certain pleasurable renunciation of one’s 
own ego boundaries, the pleasure of a kind of self-obliteration 
[. . .] 
Silverman: Your idea of a communication of forms seems to be really new 
and original. I think it’s a mistake to fold it back into your earlier 
  21 
argument about self-shattering and masochism [. . .] It suggests 
that you’re still talking about body or psyche [. . .] In fact, you’re 
talking about form. 
Bersani: What for you is a reactive gesture is for me a point of departure. 
Our move toward the correspondence of forms [. . . ] depends on a 
certain notion of masochism. If there weren’t pleasure in giving up 
what our civilization insists that we retain—our ego boundaries—
the communication of forms would never occur. So masochism is 
the precondition of this passage.32 
 
 
By 2000, we can see that Bersani seems to have changed his mind on precisely 
this issue. By that point, he is seeking to dissociate the notion of the communication of 
forms from primary masochism and ébranlement, in an explicit and self-conscious  
disavowal of his own earlier work:  
   
Much of this now seems to me a rather facile, even irresponsible 
celebration of “self-defeat.” Masochism is not a viable alternative to 
mastery, either practically or theoretically. The defeat of the self belongs 
to the same relational system, the same relational imagination, as the self’s 
exercise of power; it is merely the transgressive version of that exercise    
[. . .] To neglect self-defeat in sexual relations leads to that pastoralizing of 
sexuality I have frequently criticized; but to privilege self-defeat in the 
relational field is to reduce that entire field to libidinal relationality.33 
 
 
By figuring the readiness with which the dissolution-of-the-couple trope and the 
formation-of-the-couple trope support each other, and thus by demonstrating the absolute 
governance of each by the overall structure of coupling, the “Shining” parody trailer, for 
instance, can help us to understand the reason that Bersani gives for this disavowal of his 
earlier work, and for this change in direction. Both moves are perhaps related to the way 
in which sadomasochistic sexual practices have a very hard time managing to perform the 
critique of power relations that is often claimed for them. In Homos, Bersani had 
discussed in detail the mechanisms of S/M practices, arguing that they cannot be potently 
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critical. The structure of dominance and submission must remain unassailed (or only 
impotently assailed) in S/M because it is precisely that structure that gives pleasure to the 
participants. As Bersani writes, “to empower the disenfranchised partner is [. . .] not at all 
the same thing as eliminating struggles for power in erotic negotiations.”34 In fact, he 
argues here that S/M is the opposite of subversive: “S/M fortifies those structures [of 
dominance and submission in the culture at large] by suggesting that they have an appeal 
independent of the political ideologies that exploit the appeal” (90). 
In a homologous manner, it is coupling that continually animates and gives force 
to the formation-of-the-couple trope as well as the dissolution-of-the-couple trope—and 
the latter supports coupling no less than does the former. It makes sense from the 
standpoint of this schema, then, to see the appeal of witnessing couplings and 
decouplings as indissociable from the violent pleasures available in narrativity itself. This 
is to say that the structure of coupling and the very force behind its power as form—i.e., 
the energy that forces it into its powerful form—is usually only reinforced by those 
cinematic narratives that attempt to lodge a critique of that structure within the 
framework “composed” of these same forces. 
Now, I don’t want to attribute too much originality to the heterodoxies or 
eclecticism of Bersani’s thought. Edelman, D.A. Miller, and Judith Butler, for example, 
all write and think in quite similarly eclectic modes, about similar issues. On the whole, 
Bersani’s project is by no means incommensurable with most of the work of any of these 
theorists. Yet, Bersani’s move into the “communication of forms”—and what that 
framework might mean for human subjectivity—does seem to place his work in a class of 
its own.    
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For instance, in her essay “Longing for Recognition,” Butler works through a few 
of psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin’s theories with much the same goal as in Bersani’s 
appropriation of Laplanche. She too wants to effect a kind of liberation of human subjects 
from insidious dyadic relationality. In order to assert that each of us “fundamentally is a 
subject in a temporal chain of desire that only occasionally and provisionally assumes the 
form of a dyad,” Butler relies on a notion of “ontological ek-stasis” through which the 
subject “finds itself ambiguously installed outside itself.”35 So far, this sounds similar to 
what Bersani is getting at with the extensibility of sameness. But, significantly, Butler’s 
subject is still Hegelian. It is still constituted through its recognition of its self in the 
Other: in the other subject, that is, rather than dispersed throughout the world. Thus, the 
Butlerian subject is still consistently locatable as a relatively strictly delimited subject. 
Bersani’s subject in communication, on the other hand, is defined precisely by the 
absence of such boundaries between self and world-as-other that are implicitly required 
by Butler’s argument. For Bersani, subjectivity is not merely always-already split 
between self and other. Rather, Bersanian subjectivity is dispersed, as being, throughout 
the world itself. 
It is difficult to imagine any of the various other politically motivated critics of 
coupling going there. But their reluctance to go there—or their inability to, or their 
decision not to—must be taken seriously. For, recalling the blurb for No Future, we 
should remember that Bersani himself expressed concern about the survivability of Lee 
Edelman’s prescriptions. Indeed, similar reproaches could be, and have been, leveled at 
Bersani’s writing. 36 It’s possible, then, that the relatively wide-ranging reluctance to 
embrace, or difficulties in embracing, Bersani’s work—at least his more recent work—
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derives at least in part from this problem of the survivability of the human organism in 
the communication of forms. 
With the earlier ébranlement model, Bersani had acknowledged exactly this site 
of difficulty. In Homos, he wrote: “To survive in any environment requires a degree of 
invasive intent with respect to that environment; the exercise of power is a prerequisite 
for life itself. [But . . .] the project of mastery might generate a pleasure—a thrill—
incompatible with invasive appropriations.”37 This “thrill,” the “pleasure” of 
ébranlement, is a threat to survival for two reasons. First, as Bersani describes in the 
passage that I just quoted, the body might be unable to sufficiently protect itself from 
material harm while its invasive appropriativity is suspended. Secondly, one can never be 
certain that the ego’s boundaries will then be properly “reset” once the ébranlement 
recedes. This second danger seems unlikely when ébranlement is considered in its aspect 
as an event accessible through certain sexual practices. (Do you know anyone who went 
crazy from an orgasm?) But when one thinks about ébranlement as “present, always, not 
primarily in our orgasms, but rather in the terrifying but also exhilarating instability of 
human subjectivity,” this danger must be taken, essentially, as our permanent condition 
anyway. 38 As for the first threat, that of the body’s unprotectedness, this too might be 
dismissible as little more than an intensification (and a mild one, at that) of the condition 
under which each of us persists even while our ego boundaries are as stable as we can 
possibly make and maintain them. 
But now, the power of ébranlement to offer an escape from the clutches of the 
relational regime of the enigmatic signifier no longer seems viable to Bersani. Instead, 
the radical hope for a better way of relating, which has always been legible between the 
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lines of his texts, has settled on the potentialities inherent in the communication of forms. 
But, since ébranlement seemed a threat to survival, it is important here to ask why the 
communication of forms—in which “subjectivity” as such is no longer even locatable—
would not be an equally unlivable ethical, aesthetic and political “form of being.” 
Writing with Dutoit, Bersani at length discusses Witt, a key character in Terrence 
Malick’s The Thin Red Line. In their reading, Witt figures, or gives image to, the living of 
the communication of forms. Bersani and Dutoit write:  
 
[H]is unforgettable presence is the result of his ontological passivity—not 
the passivity of someone who submits to the will of others, but the active 
passivity of someone who, acknowledging that he is the world in which he 
lives, makes his self superfluous in order to multiply his being. The 
attentive way in which Witt’s look simply lets the world be also replicates 
the world as an accretion to a consciousness, and a look, ceaselessly 
receptive to the world. The forms it absorbs constitute the identity of the 
absorbing consciousness.39  
 
 
This mode of being is that of a subject divested of subjectivity, that is, a non-
psychological subject, attuned to the communication of forms and constitutively unable 
to enter into relations of coupling or property. “The astonishing unprotectedness of Witt’s 
look designates a subject without claims on the world, who owns nothing (not even the 
life he so freely gives at the end)” (164-165; emphasis mine). If Bersani neglects to 
explain how to survive the self-divestiture of subjectivity necessary in order to access the 
communication of forms, this may be because such an act is simply not permanently 
survivable. The subject divested of subjectivity may be necessarily unconcerned with the 
preservation of the self. 
This, I believe, is why the subject divested of subjectivity, and the 
correspondences to which it is supremely receptive, are in Bersani’s later work not 
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merely allegorized by readings of works of art such as The Thin Red Line and Le Mépris, 
but are actually produced by the encounter with the work of art. As Bersani has put it, 
“the most detailed discussions of specific works can be not formalistic exercises, but 
rather absolutely identical with philosophical reflection. Close reading can be 
psychically, perhaps even ontologically re-creative.”40 What is being “re-created” in such 
readings is, I think, precisely the subject divested of subjectivity. 
This is to say that, although engagement with the communication of forms is not 
permanently survivable, nothing in Bersani’s work claims that we should or can adopt 
this mode of being as a permanent mode. Rather, the subject divested of subjectivity is a 
flickering subject, a glimmering subject, a mode of being that comes and goes but must 
not stay put—and perhaps cannot stay put. 
Bersani and Dutoit’s very impulse to discuss The Thin Red Line derives from the 
idea that “[w]ar, and the jouissance that nourishes war, contradicts universal presence. To 
show this is art’s highest ethical accomplishment.”41 They suggest that exploring the 
communication of forms “requires a suspension of strictly human interests, a removal 
from those existential contexts in which paranoid fascination is the human subject’s 
spontaneous response to the other’s soliciting (or even interested) gaze.”42 Becoming a 
subject divested of subjectivity “requires a relational discipline capable of yielding an 
ascetic pleasure that may, at least intermittently, supersede the jouissance of ‘the blindest 
fury of destructiveness.’”43  
The key phrases here are: 1) “suspension,” and 2) “at least intermittently.” The 
encounter with a work of art is an opportunity to engage in a practice of receptivity 
capable of recharging the subject’s divestiture-of-subjectivity batteries, so to speak. This 
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is not so as to close off the subject’s access to other, more appropriative modes of being. 
Rather, it is so that the non-appropriative mode of relationality to the work/world will 
remain flickeringly available, at least for a while, after he or she turns away from the 
work of art and re-turns to everyday life. 
One of the relatively few internal contradictions of Bersani’s work, though 
perhaps a major one, was noted by the writer himself in the prologue to The Culture of 
Redemption. Within a period during which many of his theoretical polemics attacked the 
notion of stable identity and “authoritative selfhood,” Bersani admitted that his own work 
displayed “a slightly dispiriting consistency.”44 I think this refers to a double tendency 
in/of his own writing style and critical method. 
On the one hand, contrary to the style of authorship he most often praises, the 
aesthetic of Bersani’s own work is consistently authoritative. That is, his writing seldom 
comes close to what he has variously called: 
• inapplicable discourse: “At the price of a certain indifference to the 
beneficial effects of thought’s mastery of nature (including its own 
nature), art cultivates a deliberately fragmentary, unusable, even ignorant 
relational play with the entries of its culture’s encyclopedia,”45 
• formal irresolution: “Only the non-aesthetic is formally fixed and 
readable; a sign of the aesthetic is formal irresolution,”46 and: 
• the negativizing movement of self-reflexiveness: “resolutely nonredemptive 
art, far from making sense of life, initiates us to the pleasures of an 
uncritical participation in the text’s own trance of agitated repetitions 
[and] also cultivates an ironic reserve toward its own excesses.”47  
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On the other hand, each of Bersani’s new publications seems to function primarily 
in response to his own oeuvre up to that point. In one peculiar way, his work is thus 
seeming to become even more consistent than ever before. Evidence of this is his more 
and more consistent choice not to cite his sources. While trying (in vain) to track down 
the origin of a phrase in Forms of Being that sounded to me like it might (or might not) 
be an allusion to something in Hegel, it occurred to me that Bersani and Dutoit’s text, 
despite vociferously arguing against the regime of the enigmatic signifier, had positioned 
me, the attentive reader, precisely as a paranoid subject searching for “clues” that may or 
may not have been intended as clues at all. This tendency is exacerbated by the fact that 
Bersani has stated and restated his ideas in ways that have grown increasingly cryptic, 
aphoristic, even kōan-like. 
In other words, the mode of “close reading”—and “close moving-image textual 
engagement”—practiced by Bersani and Dutoit, as well as others (for example, Edelman, 
D.A. Miller, Tom Cohen) can indeed be “ontologically re-creative” of a subject divested 
of subjectivity, for/in/through the subject who is performing the reading. But the mode of 
reading required of the reader of the texts thus produced is not necessarily the same. 
Indeed, in important ways Bersani’s texts do not themselves commission such a subject, 
unless the reader knows (how) to, and is willing to, accord Bersani’s critical text a 
certain sort of relational “generosity.” 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
SHININGS 
 
What the subject sees in such “recharging” sessions is, according to Bersani, the 
“shining” of being in art.48 For Bersani, the extensibility of sameness does not need to be 
created. It is simply a condition of being. But it does need to be made visible to us as a 
condition under which we always already persist. Visual art, and especially cinematic art, 
enjoys a special capacity for such making-visible, such shining. But these works of art 
must be met halfway by a subject who does not strive for interpretation, but who is 
attentive and receptive to correspondences among appearances. 
In this sense, the stakes laid down in Forms of Being have to do with the 
possibility of lodging a critique of coupling within a narrative cinematic text that employs 
the tropes of the formation and/or dissolution of a couple. Here the way in which a work 
of art, especially a film, might help us to escape coupling is not through performing any 
kind of “critique.” (Though, of course, it might quite effectively critique something else 
at the same time.) This is crucial to Bersani’s understanding of what he has called the 
ethico-aesthetics of cinema. For him, “the perceptual aesthetic of film can be ethically 
defended. It registers not the real world ‘as it is,’ but a positioning in a real world. The 
images of film propose relational models, which means that film can’t help but work 
within the field of ethics.”49 In this sense, works of art do not critique anything. Rather, 
they show us how to be better. When they do so, they “shine.” And when we see what 
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they show us, we shine back, in a “withdrawal from the visible world into the superior 
visibility of what has been derealized.”50  
Our best hope of relating to each other without seeking to destroy what is other 
about each other may be achievable only through attentive, actively passive encounters 
with formally irresolute art. And it is precisely here that something like an “alternative” 
to coupling can be said to present itself. 
The alternative to couple-based responsibilities, the alternative that—for 
instance—Jack Torrance winds up embracing in The Shining, is not necessarily the 
“permanent stasis of frozen death.” In the end, the murderous rampage of Jack 
Nicholson’s character Jack proves to be largely unsuccessful. His son Danny and wife 
Wendy repeatedly escape his axe’s blade, and he manages to kill only Halloran, the cook. 
The rampage ends in the hotel’s hedge maze, as Jack, tricked by Danny’s backtracking 
and footprint-erasing tactics, cannot find the way out. Eventually, Jack sits down in a pile 
of snow. The nighttime blizzard continues to blow. Next, we are presented a daylit image 
of a literally frozen Jack, icicles hanging from his face. His eyes are rolled up, unseeing. 
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But this is not Kubrick’s last word. For next we are shown a shot of a long 
hallway inside the hotel. We hear jazz, party music. The camera moves slowly forward, 
down the hallway, approaching a group of photographs on the far wall. A few cuts bring 
us closer to these images. At last, a single photograph fills the frame. It is a black-and-
white image of a crowd of people in formal dress celebrating some special occasion. The 
camera continues to advance, until we see that Jack Torrance occupies a central position 
in this group shot, smiling straight at us with wide, gleaming eyes. In the final seconds of 
the film, Kubrick’s camera tracks down to reveal the photograph’s caption: “Overlook 
Hotel, July 4th Ball, 1921.” Jack is celebrating independence at last. 
Kubrick’s use of the word “shining”—in the film as in the Stephen King novel 
from which it is taken, a sort of telepathy combined with precognition—is not identical to 
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Bersani’s. But there is something to learn about the latter from the cook Halloran’s 
anecdote about his childhood experiences with his psychic power. Earlier in the film, 
Halloran tells Danny: “My grandmother and I could hold conversations entirely without 
ever opening our mouths. She called it shining. And for a long time I thought it was just 
the two of us that had the shine to us.” 
This is precisely the delusion under which Jack, like all subjects in intimately 
conjoined couples, labors while living. It is never “just the two of us” that have the 
“shine” to us. The shine is in all the world, but it is up to us to see it and shine back. Jack 
becomes mad because he fails to become-shining, fails to find himself replicated outside 
himself. In his son. In the keys of his typewriter. In the texte he produces. In the ball he 
furiously throws against the walls of the hotel, and in the patterns on those walls. Above 
all, in Wendy: to whom he never could see that he need no longer remain coupled, even 
were they to remain together. In Scenes from a Marriage, Johan and Marianne divorced, 
but ceaselessly remained coupled. Jack too—even as he threatened to bash Wendy’s 
brains “right the fuck in”—remained coupled to her as strongly as ever, if not more so. 
Here lies the surprising significance of a change that Kubrick made to his film 
after its initial premiere.51 The director removed a final scene that originally followed the 
July 4th photograph that now ends the film. In the deleted scene, Wendy, recovering in a 
hospital, is told that searchers have failed to find Jack’s body, the body we have seen 
frozen in the snow. 
 The scene had to go in order to lend a more perfectly final symmetry to the two 
still images of Jack, each centered in its cinematic frame—a sort of frozen-to-“frozen” 
“cut” that re-stages, with a difference, Kubrick’s iconic bone-to-spaceship cut from 2001. 
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But I would assert that this extra scene had to go, too, because it implied that 
Jack’s body had vanished into the photograph, when, in fact, something very important is 
happening between these two co-existent “still” images, as Kubrick clearly knows, though 
via different pathways of thought. The first image (frozen Jack) figures the subject 
tormented by the enigmatic signifier and driven straight through the end of invasive 
appropriativity, into immobilization. In the second (Jack’s photo from “out-of-time”), we 
see the alternative: an attentive, actively passive subject divested of subjectivity,  
comporting himself toward non-copulative pairings. Ready to witness, obviously having 
witnessed, and witnessing the communication of forms. Overlooking it everywhere. 
He looks a little mad in that final image as well. 
And he’s looking, you’ll notice, at us. 
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1 Like Bergman’s Face to Face (1976) and Fanny and Alexander (1982), Scenes from a 
Marriage exists in two versions: a television miniseries (1973, 299 minutes, six 
episodes) and an abbreviated theatrical cut (1974, 169 minutes). Although there are 
many differences between the two texts, they are not relevant to my argument. 
 
2 The film’s recent sequel Saraband (2003) posits one possible fate for these characters. 
But the sequel’s existence should not constrain interpretation of the earlier film. 
 
3 To this day, the name Ingmar Bergman readily serves as a synecdoche for the entire 
postwar-European-film-as-high-art canon, and his name almost automatically 
commissions opinions about the value of canonicity. See for instance a New York 
Times article (very recent as of this writing) about a DVD box set of Bergman’s 
earliest cinematic work. Released as the initial offering in a new line of ostensibly 
“lost, forgotten, or overshadowed classics,” the set is criticized for failing to live up 
to that mission statement precisely due to Bergman’s status as the Art Film auteur 
par excellence. Dave Kehr, “Critic’s Choice: New DVD’s,” The New York Times, 
April 3, 2007, final edition, section E. 
 
4 For example, see Lee Lescaze, “The Shining: Not So Bright,” The Washington Post, 
June 13, 1980, final edition, Lexis-Nexis (“Nicholson is never a convincingly warm 
father and husband. From the start, his twitching eyebrows and eerie smiles forecast 
his spiral into madness”); Jay Scott, “The Shining Doesn’t: Kubrick at His Most 
Ponderous and Least Humorous,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), June 14, 1980, 
Lexis-Nexis (“Jack Nicholson's face-straining performance [. . .] lets us know 
immediately that the man is a murderous lunatic”); Eric Norden, “Playboy 
Interview: Stephen King,” Playboy 30, no. 6 (1983): 24 (“If [Jack Torrance] is nuts 
to begin with, then the entire tragedy of his downfall is wasted”). 
 
5 Michel Ciment, Kubrick: The Definitive Edition (New York: Faber and Faber, 2001), 
144-146. 
 
6 This parody circulated on the Web in late 2005 and spawned a host of mostly inferior 
imitators, such as “Scary Mary” (Mary Poppins recast as a horror thriller in the vein 
of Candyman). This was followed by dozens of queerings of popular films 
accomplished by recutting, say, clips from Back to the Future or Heat and 
overdubbing the main musical theme of Brokeback Mountain onto the result 
(Virginia Heffernan, “Brokeback Spoofs: Tough Guys Unmasked,” The New York 
Times, March 2, 2006, final edition, Lexis-Nexis). “Shining” may been viewed at 
http://www.ps260.com/molly/SHINING%20FINAL.mov 
 
7 For instance, see Peggy Phelan, “Homos” (review), Contemporary Sociology 25, no. 1 
(1996), 82-83. “As a reader of this political moment,” Phelan writes, “Bersani is 
muddled, arrogant, ethically small.” For Phelan, the central thesis of this book also 
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“comes perilously close to arguments made by the New Right…[The] ideal that 
Bersani champions has often been used as a justification for screwing everyone 
except white men of privilege, straight or gay.” 
 
8 Adam Phillips, “Narcissism, For and Against,” in Promises, Promises: Essays on 
Psychoanalysis and Literature, 200 (New York: Basic, 2001). 
 
9 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke, 2004).  
 
10 Edelman, 3 (emphasis in original). 
 
11 Actually, in the book’s “acknowledgements” Edelman does put the couple on the table 
right up-front by thanking his longtime partner: “My debt to Joseph Litvak is in a 
category of its own and continues, daily, accumulating interest beyond my ability to 
repay it. His generosity, both emotional and intellectual, makes better everything it 
touches and I count myself singularly fortunate to be able to owe him so much.” 
(Ibid., x). Invoking Litvak’s name in this way, with reference to an apparently 
inescapable and stabilizing relation of presumably mutual ow(n)ing, further 
disinstalls No Future—radical as it may be (and this is a very radical book!)—from 
the project of coupling-critique in which I am interested here. 
 
12 Ibid., back cover. 
 
13 Leo Bersani, The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art (New York: Columbia, 
1986), 38. 
 
14 Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Arts of Impoverishment: Beckett, Rothko, Resnais. 
(Cambridge: Harvard, 1993), 142. Also, crucially, see Leo Bersani, “Is the Rectum 
a Grave?” October 43 (1987): 197-222. Note: In this essay I will draw no sharp 
distinction between Bersani’s solo work and his collaborations with Dutoit. It is 
mostly for the sake of compositional convenience, and not to diminish Dutoit’s by-
all-accounts major contributions, that I will occasionally seem to credit ideas 
expressed in their co-authored texts to Bersani alone. 
 
15 Leo Bersani, The Culture of Redemption, (Cambridge: Harvard, 1990), 38. 
 
16 For rimming, see Leo Bersani, Homos, (Cambridge: Harvard, 1995), 157-160. For 
cruising, see Ibid., 129; Leo Bersani, “Sociability and Cruising,” UMBR(a) (2002): 
9-23. And for “homosexual activity in general,” see practically all his work, but 
especially Bersani, Homos; Leo Bersani et al, “A Conversation with Leo Bersani,” 
October 82 (1997): 3-16; and Bersani, “Sociability and Cruising.” 
 
17 For “puritanical feminism,” see Bersani, Homos, 53-56. For the “redemptive 
reinvention of sex,” see Bersani, “Is the Rectum a Grave?” 215. 
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18 In this regard Bersani is no different from many other theorists—cf. the many 
published interviews with Derrida, Deleuze, etc. 
 
19 Bersani et al, “A Conversation with Leo Bersani,” 6. 
 
20 I see this as a reinflection, a shift in focus, rather than an entirely new concept: both 
aspects of ébranlement may be found to obtain in Bersani’s earliest descriptions of 
it. See Bersani, The Freudian Body, 60-64; Bersani, “Is the Rectum a Grave?” 216-
218, especially 218 n.25. 
 
21 Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Forms of Being: Cinema, Aesthetics, Subjectivity 
(London: BFI, 2004), 19.  
 
22 Leo Bersani, “Sociality and Sexuality” Critical Inquiry 26 (2000): 646. 
 
23 Bersani and Dutoit, Forms of Being, 37-39. 
 
24 Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Caravaggio (London: BFI, 1999), 71. 
 
25 Bersani and Dutoit, Forms of Being, 8-9. 
 
26 Bersani and Dutoit, Caravaggio, 71-72 (emphasis in original). 
 
27 Bersani et al, “An Interview with Leo Bersani,” 14. 
 
28 Bersani, “Sociality and Sexuality,” 656. 
 
29 Bersani, Homos, 128. 
 
30 Bersani and Dutoit, Forms of Being, 137. 
 
31 Bersani, Leo, and Ulysse Dutoit. “A Response to Patrick ffrench and Peter Caws.” 
Film-Philosophy 9, no. 5 (2005), http://www.film-philosophy.com/vol9-
2005/n5bersanidutoit (accessed April 9, 2007). 
 
32 Bersani et al, “A Conversation with Leo Bersani,” 6. 
 
33 Bersani, “Sociality and Sexuality,” 648 (emphasis mine). 
 
34 Bersani, Homos, 82. 
 
35 Judith Butler, “Longing for Recognition,” in Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 
2004), 150-151. 
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36 Patrick ffrench raises something close to such a concern in his review of Forms of 
Being. See Patrick ffrench, “Potential Not To Be: Bersani and Dutoit’s Forms of 
Being,” Film-Philosophy 9, no. 5 (2005). http://www.film-philosophy.com/vol9-
2005/n3ffrench; see also Bersani and Dutoit, “A Response to Patrick ffrench and 
Peter Caws.” 
 
37 Bersani, Homos, 99. 
 
38 Bersani et al, “A Conversation with Leo Bersani,” 6; I have quoted this line once 
already. 
 
39 Bersani and Dutoit, Forms of Being, 165. 
 
40 Bersani and Dutoit, “A Response to Patrick ffrench and Peter Caws” (unpaginated). 
 
41 Bersani and Dutoit, Forms of Being, 177 (emphasis in original). 
 
42 Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Caravaggio’s Secrets (Cambridge: MIT, 1998), 42. 
 
43 Bersani and Dutoit, Forms of Being, 177 (emphasis in original). 
 
44 Bersani, The Culture of Redemption, 3. 
 
45 Ibid., 131-133. 
 
46 Bersani and Dutoit, Forms of Being, 67. 
 
47 Bersani, The Culture of Redemption, 122. 
 
48 Bersani and Dutoit, Caravaggio’s Secrets, 42; Bersani and Dutoit, Forms of Being, 8, 
70, 170; Leo Bersani, “Psychoanalysis and the Aesthetic Subject,” Critical Inquiry 32 
(2006): 163, 170. 
 
49 Bersani and Dutoit, Forms of Being, 175 (emphasis in original). 
 
50 Bersani, “Psychoanalysis and the Aesthetic Subject,” 170. 
 
51 This was not unprecedented. Kubrick had made extensive post-premiere cuts to 2001: 
A Space Odyssey. Roger Ebert, “Great Movies: The Shining.” Rogerebert.com, 
http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060618/REVIEWS08/6061
80302/1023 
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